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COMMUNICATION
Obama and the US policy change on Iran
Shahram Akbarzadeh
National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies, University of Melbourne, Australia
President Barack Obama has inherited an unenviable legacy in relation to Iran. Relations
between Iran and the United States have suffered blow after blow in the last three decades.
The Iranian revolution of 1979 deposed a close US ally and brought to power a religious
regime with the rallying cry of ‘Down with America’. Soon after, the US Embassy in Tehran
was raided, resulting in 444 days of hostage taking. The damage caused by this episode was
severe; it delivered shock waves of disbelief and indignation to the political elite in the
United States and turned US public opinion against Iran. This initial shock was followed by a
growing unease in Washington about Iran’s message of revolt and rebellion against ruling
regimes in the region. Tehran’s attempts at instigating a regional shake-up were a serious
concern for Washington. Although these attempts did not lead to mass uprisings, the revolutionary
rhetoric from Iran made incumbent Arab regimes very nervous – a key factor for their support
of Iraq’s eight-year war with Iran.
In the meantime, Tehran developed close ties with the Shi’a community in Lebanon; helping
form and train Hizbullah. This move threw Iran onto the centre stage of Arab–Israeli conflict – a
position it has maintained and cherished ever since. Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 1982 and
its inability to dislodge Hizbullah from southern Lebanon in the July 2006 war have been inter-
preted as victories by Hizbullah, and by extension by its backers in Iran and Syria. If Iran’s
threats to regional stability and Israel were not enough, the resumption of its nuclear program
has ensured its top priority on the US Middle East agenda. Iran’s failure to open its nuclear
facilities to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and non-compliance on the
suspension of uranium enrichment have resulted in three levels of sanctions by the United Nations.
In short, Iran’s relations with the international community, and the United States in particular,
have been under severe strains for the last 30 years. This is what President Obama has inherited.
Barack Obama came to office with a promise of change. In terms of US policy towards the
Middle East, change cannot be case-specific. Given the interwoven nature of politics in the
region, policy change needs to be all-encompassing and universal. The Obama Administration
appears attuned to this need and views its Iran policy as a component of a larger Middle East
policy that includes the protracted Arab–Israeli tension, the Palestinian issue, pervasive author-
itarian practices in the region, terrorism and, most pressing of all, the extraction of US combat
troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a refreshing change, allowing the US Administration
to examine and deal with Iran in proportion to its significance.
President Obama has been trying to break the familiar pattern of threats and counter-threats
when dealing with Iran – a pattern that had become the staple of the Bush approach. The antag-
onistic tone of US declarations on Iran, epitomized in President George W. Bush’s State of the
Union Address in 2002 which designated Iran as part of the Axis of Evil, marked a turning point
in US–Iran relations.
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In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Iran’s message of sympathy to the United States and
the subsequent collaboration to reconstruct post-Taliban Afghanistan had opened a window of
opportunity. The Axis of Evil speech put an end to that opportunity. The subsequent invasion
of Iraq (March 2003), which bolstered the neo-conservatives and their call for regime change
in Iran, was a serious blow to Iranian reformists under President Khatami. President Khatami’s
attempts to find a way around the official deadlock in bilateral relations by initiating his famous
‘dialogue of civilizations’ project was discredited for making Iran look weak. The American talk
of regime change and the stationing of US troops on both sides of the country, as well as their
presence in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, galvanized the many factions in the regime.
The ascendancy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the 2005 presidential election, which came
fast on the heels of the conservatives’ parliamentary victory in 2004, marginalizing the reformist
faction, was directly linked to the new geo-strategic line-up. Ahmadinejad’s revival of the fiery
revolutionary rhetoric that defined the early years of the Islamic Republic was a predictable
response to the growing sense of siege in the embattled clerical regime. Reverting back to the
familiar cocoon of ‘anti-imperialist’ grand-standing served to bolster up support for the
regimes in the face of an ostensibly impending pre-emptive strike by Washington.
The Iranian regime also managed to fan nationalist fervour by elevating the question of
access to nuclear technology to a matter of national pride. Iran’s nuclear program was
revived under President Khatami’s leadership, causing alarm in Western capitals. But it was
under President Ahmadinejad that Iran took an uncompromising position in its response to
the International Atomic Energy Agency and refused unfettered access to its nuclear facilities
while continuing its uranium enrichment program. President Ahmadinejad opted for the
emotive and theatrical, calling the nuclear fuel cycle ‘Iran’s inalienable right’ in his 2005
speech at the UN General Assembly. In the same breath, he attacked the unequal power relation-
ship where ‘powerful governments’ cajole and bully other states.
President Ahmadinejad’s grand-standing won him some popularity in the Muslim world,
although not among incumbent regimes. To many, this was a legitimate and defiant response
to the Bush Administration’s threats of ‘regime change’, conveyed in President George
W. Bush’s insistence that ‘all options are on the table’, including the military option. But this
position is no longer tenable as President Obama goes through a major overhaul of US
Middle East policy, trying to undo the damage that the neo-conservatives did to the standing
of the United States.
A remarkable example of President Obama’s new approach was his message to the people of
Iran on 21 March 2009, the first day of the northern spring and the Iranian New Year – also
known as Norouz. In a message delivered on YouTube, President Obama paid homage to
the great Persian civilization and its contribution to the world. This was a significant charm
offensive. It was a direct appeal to the people which did not require official intermediaries.
By referring to Iran’s great culture and civilization it showed respect. This was a far-reaching
gesture. Respect has not been in the US’s Iran policy tool-box for decades. President Obama
was trying a new approach and that caused a stir in Iran, catching the hardliners off-guard.
A more substantial shift has been the suggestion that the United States would not place pre-
conditions on Iran’s presence at the negotiating table with the International Atomic Energy
Agency.1 The previous administration had made the suspension of uranium enrichment a
necessary pre-condition for any talks. This position had only hardened the resolve of the clerical
leadership in Iran, digging in their heels and refusing to be intimidated into submission. Their
message of defiance was a perfect fit with President Ahmadinejad’s ideological worldview
and his constituency. But by removing all pre-conditions for negotiation, and dangling the
1 Ewen MacAskill. ‘Obama to drop uranium precondition for Iran nuclear talks’, www.guardian.co.uk, 14 April 2009
(accessed 20 May 2009).
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prospects of direct bilateral talks, Washington has made cliche´ objections from Tehran
irrelevant. Instead, this initiative allows Iran not to appear weak and to save face domestically
and internationally. This is a major concern for the clerical leadership as it has built and jealously
guarded a proud reputation of not capitulating to foreign pressure. Removing pre-conditions to
talks allows the Iranian leadership to claim ‘victory’ while joining negotiations on the future of
Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Obama’s approach to Iran holds promise because it is multilayered and complex. In the past
Iran has been able to exploit differences between the United States, Russia and China to thwart
tough international sanctions. Both Russia and China have hydrocarbon interests in Iran and are
uncomfortable with the expanding reach of the US military into the region. Any attempt to dis-
suade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon’s program would therefore require the involvement
of all permanent members of the Security Council. This background gives the ‘re-setting’ of
US–Russia relations greater significance. When Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, pressed
the re-set button with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, she indicated that the sensitive
issues of NATO expansion to countries bordering Russia could be re-considered. Allaying
Russian concerns about NATO expansion in the former Soviet space is emerging as a key
plank of the Obama Administration’s policy towards Russia, a proposition that has upset
many neo-conservatives. Sally McNamara, a Senior Policy Analyst at the Margaret Thatcher
Center For Freedom, wrote in the neo-conservative The Heritage Foundation think-tank:
‘President Obama must also make clear that the United States will not bargain away U.S.
support for NATO enlargement to include Georgia and Ukraine, or missile defenses in
Europe in exchange for Russian cooperation on other issues, such as its negotiations to stop
Iran’s nuclear program’.2 Given the level of public distrust in relation to Iran, and the persistent
lobbying of the neo-conservatives and pro-Israeli interest groups, it remains to be seen how long
the current administration can maintain its current course.
The persistent Palestinian–Israeli conflict has been an open wound in the Middle East,
serving as a banner of discontent for Arab nationalism and Islamic solidarity as well as providing
a ready excuse for extremist groups. The United States has ignored the plight of the Palestinians
at its own peril. While the Clinton Administration tried to bring the conflict to an end and help
the emergence of a Palestinian state at the 2000 Camp David Summit, both sides were suffering
from a good will deficit. Clinton’s rush to achieve an historic legacy for his presidency did not
impress the Palestinians. Subsequently, the question of Palestinian statehood was overshadowed
by the war on terror and the search for Osama bin Laden. It was only in 2002–2003 that
President George W. Bush turned his attention to the Palestinian–Israeli dispute. His intervention
held significant promise. In his Rose Garden Speech (June 2002), President Bush became the
first American president to commit himself to a two-state solution and to endorse the right of
the Palestinians to statehood. The momentum of the Road Map (launched in April 2003) to
peace, however, was soon lost as Israel continued its settlement activity and built a security
wall around the West Bank. Washington’s acquiescence to Israel’s unilateral measures was
justified in terms of Israel’s security, leading President Bush to state publicly that any future
negotiation between the two parties will need to accept ‘facts on the ground’. President Bush
acquiescing in the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Judaization of
Jerusalem shattered hopes that the United States would act as an honest broker.
The Obama Administration is aware of this legacy and keen to offer redress. President
Obama is mindful of America’s image problem as a staunch ally of Israel. That image has
suffered as the United States has as a matter of course turned a blind eye to Israel’s transgres-
sions against international law. This point was famously explored in 2006 by two US scholars
2 Sally McNamara. ‘President Obama Must Not Concede to Russian Demands over NATO’, The Heritage Foundation,
8 May 2009, http://www.heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasia/wm2431.cfm (accessed 20 Mary 2009).
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in their controversial publication ‘The Israel Lobby’.3 Mearsheimer and Walt argued for a
demarcation of American interests in the Middle East from those of Israel. Rejecting as
fallacy the assumed unity of these interests, Mearsheimer and Walt criticized successive admin-
istrations’ willingness to allow the pro-Israel lobby to set American foreign policy in the Middle
East. President Obama appears determined to change that image. This was made clear at the first
meeting between President Obama and Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu in May 2009, when
Obama insisted on the urgency of halting settlement expansions and asking the Israeli prime
minster to commit to a two-state solution. In this vein, President Obama refused to allow
Israel to hijack the meeting and advance an anti-Iranian agenda. For Prime Minister Netanyahu
the most pressing and urgent issue to discuss was Iran’s assumed nuclear weapons program, but
as far as the Obama team was concerned, Iran was one issue among others in the Middle East.
Separating its policy towards Iran from that of Israel, means that the Obama Administration
will need to acknowledge Iran’s regional role and interests. There are hard realities at play that
go beyond revolutionary rhetoric. Sandwiched between Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries
which have experienced regime change at the hands of the United States and its allies, it is
no wonder the Iranian leadership has been anxious. But with the new administration in Washing-
ton, anxiety about an impending attempt at regime change in Tehran could give way to a more
constructive approach to the region. Iran has historical ties with both Afghanistan (based on
ethnicity and language) and Iraq (based on Shi’a solidarity). The descent of these states into
anarchy is not in Iran’s interests. A lawless Afghanistan would be a source of refugees and
drugs (as has been the pattern over the last three decades) and a disintegrating Iraq would
provide a haven for the Iranian Kurdish separatists. Tehran may not have been happy with
the way Afghanistan and Iraq experienced regime change, but for the first time in the last 30
years of the Islamic republic, Tehran is dealing with two governments that acknowledge their
shared history and welcome Iran’s role in their recovery. Why would Iran squander this
opportunity to spread its influence?
The best chance of bringing Washington and Tehran to the table is to deal with tangible and
practical issues that hold interest for both parties. Stability in Afghanistan and Iraq offer that
common ground. But a US–Iran rapprochement, however unlikely it may seem at the
present, has been a source of concern for Israel and Sunni regimes in the Middle East. Saudi
Arabia and Egypt have cosied up with Washington, enjoying a special relationship since the
fall of the Shah in Iran. The prospect of a revived US–Iran partnership threatens to jeopardize
these special relationships. This concern may have been behind warnings of an emerging ‘Shi’a
Crescent’ by Sunni Arab leaders in Amman and Cairo. Such warnings are aimed at reinforcing
fears and animosity towards Iran among the US public and political elite. To Obama’s credit,
however, his administration does not seem swayed by such fear-mongering.
A long-standing issue in relations between Iran and the United States has been the concept of
justice. The Iranian clerical leadership has consistently argued that the international system is
dominated by the American superpower and is therefore inherently unjust. President Ahmadine-
jad said as much in his 2005 UN speech. Washington’s unilateral decision to invade Iraq without
the approval of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the systemic use of its veto
power to shield Israel from UNSC sanctions, have regularly been cited as examples of this
‘unjust’ system. But President Obama’s effort to modify Israeli actions in relation to settlements
in the West Bank and the future of the Palestinians, as well as signalling a return to multilater-
alism in US foreign policy make that accusation harder to justify.
Obama’s charm offensive has had a profound impact on Iran. The incumbent conservative
government in Tehran is ill-equipped to deal with the new message from Washington. President
Obama does not fit the familiar cliche´ of an imperialist bully. He has done well to distance his
3 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, ‘The Israel Lobby’, London Review of Books 28, no. 6, 23 March 2006.
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administration from past practices. This is the best thing he can do to undermine the hardliners in
Iran on the eve of the June 12 Presidential elections.
Note on contributor
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